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Abstract in English 
European governments aim to raise labour supply, cut unemployment and, at the same time, 
maintain social cohesion. Yet, economists have stressed the trade-off between these objectives. 
This paper reviews the key policy insights from optimal tax theory to identify options for 
reform in the tax-benefit system that can potentially improve the equity-efficiency trade-off. 
Using a comprehensive applied general equilibrium model, we then explore whether reforms 
along these lines in the actual Dutch tax-benefit system will raise employment without 
sacrificing equality. The analysis reveals that selective tax relief for elastic secondary earners 
and low-skilled workers have this potential. A flat income tax structure - possibly combined 
with a negative income tax - worsens the equity-efficiency trade-off. 
 
Key words: Tax-benefit system; Labour supply; Unemployment; the Netherlands; Applied 
general equilibrium. 
 
JEL code: D31, D58, H24, J22, J68. 
 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Europese overheden streven naar het vergroten van het arbeidsaanbod, het bestrijden van 
werkloosheid en tegelijkertijd het behouden van sociale cohesie. Economen wijzen echter vaak 
op de uitruil tussen deze doelstellingen. Dit artikel gebruikt de belangrijkste inzichten uit de 
optimale belastingtheorie om beleidsopties te identificeren die deze uitruil kunnen verbeteren. 
Vervolgens wordt een toegepast algemeen evenwichtsmodel gebruikt om te kijken of 
hervormingen langs deze lijn in het Nederlandse stelsel inderdaad kunnen bijdragen aan een 
vergroting van de arbeidsdeelname zonder de sociale cohesie aan te tasten. Uit de analyse blijkt 
dat selectieve lastenverlichting voor laaggeschoolde werknemers of elastische partners in 
tweeverdienergezinnen dit kan realiseren. Een vlakke belasting op arbeid, eventueel 
gecombineerd met een negatieve inkomstenbelasting, zal de uitruil tussen gelijkheid en 
doelmatigheid juist verslechteren.  
 
Steekwoorden: Belastingen; Uitkeringen; Arbeidsaanbod; Werkloosheid; Nederland; Toegepast 
algemeen evenwicht. 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.  
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Summary 
This paper reviews the key insights from applied optimal tax models to identify the factors 
determining the equity-efficiency possibility frontier. It gives us guidance to find promising 
directions for reform in the tax benefit system. In particular, efficient redistribution calls for low 
marginal tax rates at decision margins that are relatively elastic and where population densities 
are high.  
We then use an applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands to analyse concrete 
reforms in the Dutch tax-benefit system. The model is comprehensive in describing various 
distortions induced by redistributive taxation. It encompasses decisions at the intensive margin 
of labour supply of males and females, the extensive participation decision of secondary earners 
in couples, and the extensive job acceptance decision of the unemployed. The elasticities at 
various decision margins are calibrated on the basis of empirical evidence. For various 
household types and decision margins, population densities are calibrated on the basis of Dutch 
income distributions. 
We derive a number of policy conclusions from our analysis. First, shifting the tax burden 
away from elastic secondary earners may help to raise aggregate employment levels. In case of 
the Netherlands - which features a high share of part-time work - this may be achieved by a 
progressive tax rate structure, a further individualisation of the income tax, or an extension of 
selective in-work tax credits for secondary earners.  
Second, reforms that reduce the tax burden at the extensive margin of labour supply have 
the potential to raise employment. In-work tax credits for low labour incomes may reduce 
involuntary unemployment and boost female labour-market participation rates. The risk of these 
credits is, however, that they create larger distortions at the intensive margin of labour supply. 
These can more than offset the positive participation effects if the marginal tax rate increases 
for the densely populated groups. We find that phasing out in-work tax credits just above the 
minimum wage create such severe labour-supply distortions. 
Third, flat tax reforms aimed to reduce top marginal income tax rates turn out to worsen the 
equity-efficiency trade-off: they either increase inequality or fail to raise employment if income 
inequality is maintained. The reason is that flat tax reforms tend to shift the marginal tax burden 
away from inelastic male breadwinners towards more elastic secondary earners.  
Finally, if a flat tax is combined with a basic income, it can remove the poverty trap and 
reduce low-skilled unemployment. Yet, it hurts overall labour-market performance by raising 
the marginal tax burden on the densely populated middle income groups. Indeed, we find that 
employment contracts by a considerable amount. Hence, some degree of poverty trap seems an 
inevitable consequence of redistribution and reflects the lowest efficiency cost induced by our 
social desire for equality.   
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1  Introduction 
As part of the Lisbon agenda to become the most competitive and dynamic economy in the 
world, increasing the employment rate is a top priority for European governments. The aim is 
especially to better integrate particular groups in labour market, such as the low-skilled, women, 
elderly and social benefit recipients. To achieve this goal, countries are now restructuring their 
welfare states. At the same time, however, European governments want to preserve social 
cohesion that is traditionally a major objective of the welfare states. The twin objectives ignore 
the fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency, which is inherent in the design of tax-
benefit systems. It raises the question whether reforms are feasible that improve the equity-
efficiency possibility frontier. This paper analyses the opportunities for such reforms.  
The paper starts by reviewing key insights from optimal tax theory to identify the factors 
determining the equity-efficiency possibility frontier. We discuss important results from applied 
optimal tax analyses, which gives guidance to potentially promising directions for reform. The 
optimal tax models, however, usually contain only one or two distortions, apply aggregate 
income distributions for the total population, and do not differentiate between agents. 
Moreover, most studies apply data for the United States, which has a more dispersed income 
distribution than is common in Europe and a smaller share of part-time work. This paper 
analyses reforms in the Dutch tax-benefit system by using an applied general equilibrium model 
for the Netherlands. The model is comprehensive in describing various distortions induced by 
redistributive taxation. In particular, it encompasses decisions at the intensive margin of labour 
supply of males and females, the participation decision of secondary earners in couples, and the 
job acceptance decision of the unemployed. The elasticities at various decision margins are 
calibrated on the basis of existing empirical evidence. For various household types and decision 
margins, population densities are calibrated on the basis of Dutch income distributions. 
The model simulations yield a number of policy conclusions. Selective in-work tax credits 
for low labour incomes and secondary earners in couples have the potential to raise employment 
without sacrificing equality. These selective tax credits should be targeted at decision margins 
with the highest elasticities and with the highest population densities. If they shift the marginal 
tax burden unto more densely populated groups, e.g. just above the minimum wage in the 
Netherlands, they tend to reduce employment. Flat tax reforms aimed to reduce top marginal 
income tax rates turn out to worsen the equity-efficiency trade-off. The reason is that they shift 
the marginal tax burden towards more elastic secondary earners. Removing the poverty trap by 
switching from means-tested income transfers to a general basic income exacerbates the 
distortionary impact of the tax-benefit system by raising the marginal tax burden on the densely 
populated middle income groups.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the potential for 
efficiency-enhancing reforms in the tax-benefit system on the basis of optimal tax theory. 
Section 3 demonstrates the main features of our applied general equilibrium model. Section 4  
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presents model simulations of concrete reforms in the Netherlands to see which reforms 
improve efficiency. Finally, section 5 concludes.  
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2  Optimal tax theory as a guide for reform 
Optimal tax theory provides a good starting point for an analysis of the equity-efficiency trade-
off. The theory reveals that the optimal marginal tax schedule – i.e. the tax structure that 
achieves equity goals with minimal distortions in the labour market – is found to depend on at 
least five factors.
1 First, there are two factors that determine the benefits from redistribution, 
namely: 
(i)  pre-tax income inequality; 
(ii)  social preference for redistribution; 
 
If pre-tax inequality is large and society features much aversion against inequality, the 
government should put much effort in the redistribution of incomes from high to low-ability 
agents. In this paper, we make no attempt to measure the social benefits from equality.  
The social benefits from equality should be weighed against the efficiency losses induced by 
redistribution. These efficiency costs are determined by the following three factors: 
 
(iii)  elasticity of labour supply of various agents; 
(iv)  elasticities at other decision margins; 
(v)  population density at various decision margins; 
 
The elasticity of labour supply (iii) determines the classical distortionary impact of marginal tax 
rates on the consumption/leisure choice. This distortion was already present in the original 
analysis of Mirrlees (1971). The larger is the elasticity, the bigger is the distortionary impact of 
redistributive taxation and the less redistribution is optimal. Redistributive policies may also 
distort other decision margins, such as the extensive margin of labour supply or the search and 
acceptance behaviour of the unemployed (iv). Finally, the optimal tax depends on the 
population density at various margins (v). If density is higher at some point in the income 
distribution, a marginal tax creates larger aggregate distortions so that the optimal tax rate is 
lower. 
The optimal-tax literature reports a variety of results with respect to the optimal marginal 
tax schedule. In general, these findings can be understood by the variation in assumptions on 
the factors (i) – (v). The optimal tax schedule reported in applied optimal tax studies will thus 
depend on e.g. the calibration of the income distribution, the choice of decision margins, the 
corresponding elasticities at these margins, and the disaggregation with respect to agents and 
households. Overall, optimal tax theory reveals that distortions can best be avoided if 
 
1 The seminal contribution to this literature is Mirrlees (1971). A recent review of subsequent literature and its policy 
relevance can be found in Sorensen (2007).   
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elasticities are high and if the density in the income distribution is high. Below, we summarise 
some of the main policy lessons from applied optimal tax models. 
2.1  A linear tax structure 
Mirrlees (1971) simulates the optimal marginal tax schedule for a utilitarian social welfare 
function, Cobb-Douglas preferences in consumption and leisure, and a log-normal distribution 
of abilities. He concludes that “… the most striking feature of the results is the closeness to 
linearity of the optimal tax schedules” (p.206). This result provides efficiency grounds for a flat 
income tax structure. This flat tax has considerable appeal to policy makers. Recently, a number 
of Eastern European countries have introduced flat income tax systems with a single rate on 
labour income (see Keen et al., 2006 for a review and discussion of these reforms). Also other 
European countries consider reforms in this direction.  
Subsequent contributions in the optimal tax literature have raised doubts on the optimality of 
the linear income tax schedule. Tuomala (1990) finds that the optimal marginal tax schedule is 
sensitive to the underlying assumptions. In fact, the optimal structure is non-linear if social 
welfare functions feature relatively high inequality aversion and if labour supply responses are 
different between agents. The non-linear structure is more efficient because it employs more 
information on individual earnings so that it can achieve the same redistribution with less dead 
weight loss.  
With respect to the shape of the non-linearities, early contributions to the literature conclude 
that the optimal marginal income tax features an inverse-U shape, i.e. high for middle incomes 
and low for low and high incomes. If abilities are bounded above, the optimal marginal tax on 
the highest ability agent even goes down to zero (Seade, 1977; 1982). Intuitively, a positive 
marginal tax would not contribute to redistribution but does distort labour supply of this person. 
Tuomala (1990) shows, however, that these results are very local and of little practical 
relevance.  
More recently, Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) have used pre-tax income distributions for 
the United States and a uniform positive labour supply elasticity to show that the optimal 
marginal tax structure typically features a U-shaped pattern: high at the bottom and top of the 
distribution and low for middle incomes. This result is driven by population densities. 
Intuitively, a negative average tax for the poor is necessary to redistribute income. It should be 
phased out with income in a range where the population density is not so high. In the United 
States, this is just above the minimum income. Beyond this level, the optimal marginal tax falls 
as population density increases and marginal taxes create large aggregate distortions in labour 
supply. It may rise again for higher incomes if inequality aversion is sufficiently large.
2 
 
2 The U-shaped pattern obtained from empirical income distributions opposes the zero marginal tax rate at the top of the 
income distribution found by Seade (1977; 1982). The reason is that the empirical income distribution is thicker at the top 
than the assumed log-normal distributions in the earlier studies.  
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Still, high marginal tax rates at the bottom and top of the income distribution are often criticised 
in European policy debates. High marginal income tax rates at the top are often held responsible 
for severe distortions in labour supply (see e.g. Prescott, 2004). Reducing these rates has 
therefore been advocated in many European countries. During the 1980s and 1990s, countries 
have indeed substantially reduced their top marginal tax rates. High marginal tax rates at the 
bottom of the labour market – known as the poverty trap – are held responsible for severe 
labour market distortions in Europe. Indeed, unemployment in Europe is concentrated at the 
bottom of the labour market. In this connection, some have proposed to replace means-tested 
transfer schemes by a negative income tax or: basic income (see e.g. Atkinson, 1995). It 
provides an effective floor in the income distribution and avoids complexities and 
administrative difficulties in gathering information about eligibility to means-tested social 
transfers. Moreover, non-compliance and moral hazard would disappear. The abolishment of 
means-tested benefits would reduce marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution 
and thus alleviate the poverty trap. Yet, it does not comply with the U-shaped form of the 
optimal marginal tax schedule emphasised by empirically simulated optimal tax models.  
2.2  Taxation of couples 
Empirical evidence reveals that female labour supply is more elastic than male labour supply. 
Optimal-tax principles then imply that labour income of females should be taxed at a lower 
marginal rate than labour income of males, see e.g. Rosen (1977). However, laws typically do 
not permit such discrimination on the basis of gender. Hence, the government should look for 
indicators that are correlated with it. As argued by Boskin and Sheshinski (1983), females are 
often secondary earners in families. They suggest that an optimal income tax should therefore 
differentiate marginal tax rates between primary and secondary earners. This requires selective 
taxation measures for secondary earners (Kleven et al., 2006).  
The responsiveness of secondary earners also matters for the taxation of couples (Apps and 
Rees, 2003; Kleven et al., 2006). Here, we can distinguish between joint taxation and individual 
taxation. Under individual taxation, each family member is taxed separately, independent of the 
income of other household members. Under joint taxation, the tax liability is determined by 
total family income. In progressive tax systems, the two principles score differently with respect 
to labour-market incentives for secondary earners. Indeed, compared to joint taxation, 
individual taxation imposes a lower marginal tax burden on the labour income of secondary 
earners. Individual taxation is therefore more efficient if secondary earners feature a relatively 
high elasticity. It is adopted in Demark, Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom, Belgium and 
Austria and the Netherlands. Joint taxation is adopted in United States, Germany, France, 
Portugal and Spain.  
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2.3  In-work tax credits 
Empirical studies on labour supply elasticities emphasise that the extensive margin of 
participation tends to be more elastic than the intensive margin of hours worked (Evers et al., 
2005). Efficiency concerns thus call for smaller distortions at the participation margin (Boone 
and Bovenberg, 2004). In light of this, Saez (2002) advocates in-work tax credits for low 
income workers. Such credits have gained popularity during recent decades in a number of 
countries. For instance, the United States has introduced the earned income tax credit and the 
United Kingdom the working family tax credit. These credits aim at alleviating poverty among 
the working poor, but also have important implications for labour-market incentives. On the one 
hand, the credits encourage labour-market participation of low-skilled people by raising the 
income gap between those inside and outside the labour market. On the other hand, they make 
the tax system more progressive by benefiting workers with low incomes compared to those 
with high incomes. Tax progression reduces labour-supply incentives at the intensive margin. 
Several empirical studies have analysed the labour-market implications of in-work tax 
credits. Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) find positive effects of 
the American earned income tax credit on the participation margin. Blundell et al. (2000) find 
that the working families’ tax credit has raised aggregate participation in the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, Keane and Mofit (1996) and Meyer (2002) conclude that there is no significant 
adverse effect of earned income tax credits on the intensive margin of labour supply, i.e. hours 
worked. Hence, the aggregate impact of these credits on employment is likely to be positive. 
Note, however, that none of these studies considers a balanced budget reform where in-work tax 
credits are financed by general tax increases.  
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3  MIMIC: an AGE model for the Netherlands 
This section presents an applied general equilibrium model – MIMIC – that is used to explore 
potentially promising reforms in the Dutch tax-benefit system. The model is comprehensive in 
modelling various decision margins, it contains a high degree of disaggregation in the 
household sector, and it is calibrated for a typical European country: the Netherlands.
3  
3.1  Households 
MIMIC contains a disaggregated household model aimed at describing the impact of the tax-
benefit system on labour supply and the income distribution. Table 1 gives a quick overview of 
this disaggregation. First, the model accounts for heterogeneity in various dimensions, including 
skill, cohabitation, the presence of children, whether household members participate or are 
eligible for social benefits, and age (see upper part of Table 1). Overall, the model distinguishes 
40 different household types. 
Within each type, we make a further distinction with respect to discrete options for labour 
supply (see middle part of Table 1). For instance, primary earners can choose their optimal 
working time between the options 80%, 100% and 120% of a full-time equivalent. Secondary 
earners and singles face more options. Secondary earners in couples can also opt for voluntary 
non-participation. The option that an individual chooses is derived from utility maximisation, 
with consumption and leisure as arguments, subject to a household budget constraint. The 
preference for leisure is heterogeneous across agents. We use a uniform distribution of this 
preference parameter to calibrate the high share of part-time work of secondary earners and 
single persons in the Netherlands. Hence, part-timers feature a relatively high marginal utility of 
leisure. In determining labour supply of couples, we assume that each partner makes an 
individual decision, given an average income from his or her spouse. 
 
3 See Bovenberg et al., 2000 for a core version of MIMIC. A description of the full model and its calibration can be found in 
Graafland et al., 2001.  
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Table 1  Structure of the household model in MIMIC 
   
1. Types: individual characteristics 
   
Skill  Low skilled or high skilled agents 
Cohabitation  Single or in couple 
Children  With or without children 
Labour-market status  Working or receiving a social benefit (unemployment, disability or welfare) 
Age  Students > 18; workers < 55; workers 55-64; or pensioners > 65 
 
2. Options: Choice of working time per individual 
 
Primary earner in couple  80 - 100 - 120 % of full-time equivalent 
Secondary earner in couple  0 - 30 - 50 - 80 - 100 of full-time equivalent 
Singles  50 - 80 - 100 - 120 of full-time equivalent 
 
   
3. Wage distribution   
   
Each type and option  Population density in 10 different income classes based on micro data   
 
In interpreting the labour supply responses to changes in prices and incomes, the traditional 
income and substitution effects are at work. Hence, if the marginal tax rate declines, labour 
supply increases on account of the substitution effect. A lower average tax exerts a positive 
income effect, which reduces labour supply. Based on a meta analysis of labour-supply 
elasticities by Evers et al. (2005), we set utility parameters such that the uncompensated labour-
supply elasticity equals 0.5 for secondary earners, 0.1 for primary earners and 0.25 for singles.  
Within each combination of household-hours type, we employ a wage distribution based on 
Dutch microdata (lower part of Table 1). We distinguish 10 income classes for each group and 
base the density of each class on the data for 1992. The average wage levels in the model are 
updated on the basis of realised wage growth in the Netherlands until 2006. For each income 
class, we derive disposable income by applying the Dutch tax-benefit system to the gross 
incomes. The after-tax disposable incomes and the marginal tax burdens determine labour 
supply behaviour.  
3.2  Firms 
Labour demand for high-skilled and low-skilled workers is derived from firms that maximise 
profits subject to a CES production technology. The first-order conditions reveal that labour 
demand depends on the relative wage costs for the respective types of labour. Based on time 
series estimates for the Netherlands, the substitution elasticity between high-skilled and low-
skilled workers is set at 1.15. The substitution elasticity between capital and labour is set at  
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0.25.
4 Economic profits originate from monopolistic competition without free entry. Hence, 
firms set prices as a mark-up over marginal production costs.
5 This setting allows for 
endogenous terms-of-trade effects. As the export elasticity is set at a high value of – 5 for this 
small open economy, these effects are of minor importance for our simulations. 
 
3.3  Union bargaining 
Wages are obtained from a right-to-manage model. In bargaining over wages, trade unions 
exploit their monopsony power to reap part of the rents earned in production. However, by 
setting wages above the market clearing level, trade unions create unemployment which they 
value negatively. Unions thus face a trade off between high wages and low unemployment. An 
important specification in the right-to-manage model is the fall-back position of the trade union. 
In our model, it depends on unemployment benefits and an untaxed informal wage. The latter is 
modelled as a function of labour productivity and the price of consumption. Labour productivity 
is a proxy for the wage rate in the black market, while the price of consumption reflects the 
value of household production. This specification yields a non-linear wage equation in which 
several institutional variables enter. The non-linear equation has been estimated using Dutch 
time-series data (see Graafland and Huizinga, 1999). In linearised form and evaluated in the 
initial equilibrium of MIMIC, it reads as follows (where only parameters are presented that are 
relevant for our analysis):  
 
log W = log h+ 0.3 log RR – 0.6 log(1–Ta) + 0.1 log(1–Tm) – 0.1 log U     (1) 
 
where W is the real producer wage and h stands for labour productivity. The positive coefficient 
for the replacement rate (RR) reflects larger bargaining power of the union if social benefits 
increase. Higher benefits thus raise wage demands. The average tax rate enters the wage 
equation via (1–Ta). This is because the untaxed informal wage is part of the outside option of 
the union. Higher average labour taxes therefore strengthen the relative bargaining position of 
the union and increase wage demands. The marginal tax rate enters the wage equation via (1– 
Tm). This term exerts a positive effect on wages. With a low marginal tax rate, the trade union 
will find it more attractive to bid for higher wages since a larger part of additional wage 
increases are absorbed by government in the form of taxes. The elasticity of 0.1 for the 
unemployment rate (U) is consistent with a consensus estimate from empirical studies reported 
by Blanchflower and Oswald (2005).  
 
4 This may seem small compared to the calibration of other applied general equilibrium models. It is, however, consistent 
with the majority of empirical findings, see e.g. Chirinko (2002).  
5 We do not consider taxes on rents. The reason for introducing economic profits is that employers and unions negotiate 
over this rent, which explains involuntary unemployment. Rents could alternatively be modelled as the return from a fixed 
factor in production.   
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Wages for low skilled and high skilled workers are determined as a weighted average of a 
macro wage equation and a skill-specific wage equation (with weights of ½). This is based on 
empirical findings of sectoral wages in the Netherlands by Graafland and Lever (1996). In the 
macro wage equation, the institutional variables, Ta, Tm and RR are computed as averages for 
all workers. In the skill-specific wage equation, the variables reflect averages for respective 
skill groups. 
MIMIC uses a non-linear version of the wage equation (1), see Graafland and Huizinga 
(1999). One non-linear effect deserves special attention, as it plays an important role in our 
simulations. This is the positive interaction between the replacement rate and the 
unemployment rate. Intuitively, a high unemployment rate makes it more important for trade 
unions to care about the outside option since more union members face the fall-back income. 
Accordingly, the elasticity of the replacement rate rises in the rate of unemployment. As the 
unemployment rate is higher for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers, the 
replacement rate of the low-skilled causes relatively large increases in the wages of the low 
skilled. 
 
3.4  Search-matching 
In addition to structural unemployment caused by unions, MIMIC also captures frictional 
unemployment due to imperfect matching on the labour market. Frictional unemployment is 
specified separately for low-skilled and high-skilled workers.  
The model assumes an exogenous rate of job quits that leads to vacancies. At the same time, 
there is an exogenous rate of job lay-offs that cause unemployment. We model the steady state 
of a matching process between these vacancies and the unemployed searching for work. The 
more efficient job matching becomes, the lower are the search costs for employers to fill 
vacancies and the higher is number of vacancies posted. Thus, more efficient matching reduces 
the frictional rate of unemployment. 
Matching efficiency depends on the net benefit replacement rate in two ways. First, the 
unemployed endogenously determine their search effort by trading off leisure against job 
search. A high replacement rate reduces the incentives for job search and thus reduces the 
efficiency of job matching. Second, a higher replacement rate raises the reservation wage of the 
unemployed in deciding about accepting a job offer or continue searching. The unemployed are 
thus less willing to accpt an offer if the replacement rate is higher.  
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4  Analysing reforms in the Dutch tax-benefit system 
We perform various simulations with MIMIC. They can be interpreted as an analysis of 
comparative statics. All simulations represent balanced-budget reforms. Personal income tax 
rates are always adjusted (each with the same percentage points) to maintain the public budget 
balanced ex-post, i.e. after behavioural responses have been taken into account.  
In presenting simulation outcomes, we concentrate on two types of variables reflecting 
equity and efficiency. The equity effects are presented by means of net disposable income ratios 
for different groups. For instance, the ratio of average incomes of high-skilled/low-skilled 
workers represents equality in the income distribution among workers. We also present the 
replacement ratio, which involves a weighted average of the net benefit/net wage ratio for 
various workers and where weights are based on populations in employment. Regarding 
efficiency, we present the effects on hours worked for various groups, the participation rate of 
secondary earners (labelled ‘female participation rate’), the unemployment rate, and aggregate 
employment. 
Section 4.1 analyses two flat tax proposals and a basic income. The flat tax reforms replace 
the current progressive tax structure with increasing marginal tax rates. In 2006, tax rates on 
labour income range from 34% for incomes up to € 17 000, 41% for incomes between € 17 000 
and € 30 000, 42% for incomes between € 30 000 and € 53 000 and 52% for incomes above € 
53 000. The system contains a general tax credit of € 2000. The basic income replaces means-
tested benefits and subsidies that are provided to the poor. 
Section 4.2 analyses two reforms in the taxation of couples. First, while the Dutch tax 
system is largely individualised, partners in single-earner couples can still transfer their general 
tax credit of 2 000 euro to the primary earner. We consider the individualisation of this credit. 
Second, the Dutch system contains a tax credit for secondary earners in couples, which is 
conditional on having children under 12, both partners working, and a partner income of at least 
€ 4 500. In that case, the partner with the lowest income in the family receives a credit of € 600 
per year. We consider an extension of this selective tax relief for secondary earners.  
Section 4.3 explores selective in-work tax credits for low incomes. Today, the Dutch system 
contains an earned income tax credit with a maximum of € 1350. It features a linear phase-in 
range between € 8 000 and € 16 000 and no phase-out range. We explore various extensions of 
this credit.  
4.1  Flat tax reforms 
We explore three flat income tax reforms. The first two aim to cut the top marginal tax rate. In 
the first version, we replace the current rate structure by a flat tax rate of 37.5%. This rate keeps 
the government budget balanced. The general tax credit remains unchanged. In the second flat-
tax reform, we increase the general tax credit by € 1 400. At the same time, we raise the flat tax  
  20 
rate to 43.5% to keep the government budget balanced. The extra tax credit applies only to 
people with a positive income and cannot be transferred by a non-participating partner to its 
spouse.
6 The third simulation is the introduction of a basic income of € 550 euro per month for 
all individuals above the age of 18. The basic income replaces existing income transfers, such 
as welfare benefits, basic pensions, student grants, the general tax credit and the labour tax 
credit.
7 To finance the basic income, we replace the current progressive tax system by a flat tax 
of 53.5% on all income to keep the government budget balanced. Hence, the top marginal tax 
rate increases, rather than falls. The effects of the three reforms are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2  Effects (in % changes unless indicated) of two budgetary neutral flat tax proposals  
  Flat tax 37.5%   Flat tax 43.5% & higher 
general tax credit 
Flat tax 53.5%  
& basic Income 
       
Effects on distribution       
Ratio high skilled / low skilled  1.5  0.0  - 7.6 
Mean of marginal tax rates (abs. dif)  - 2.9  0.3  7.8 
Mean of replacement rates (abs. dif)  - 1.7  0.1  - 2.6 
Effects on labour market       
Labour supply in hours  1.0  - 0.3  - 5.3 
primary earners  1.2  0.1  - 1.4 
secondary earners  0.0  - 0.2  - 8.8 
single persons  1.0  - 1.2  - 7.4 
Female participation rate  - 1.7  1.5  - 10.0 
Employment  1.4  - 0.3  - 3.8 
Unemployment rate ((abs. dif))  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 1.9 
       
Source: MIMIC simulations 
 
The 37.5% flat tax raises the income differential between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. 
This is reflected in 1.5% increase in the ratio of income between high and low skilled workers. 
The 43.5% flat tax yields smaller effects on the income distribution as people earning low 
incomes are compensated by the higher tax credit. This benefits lower incomes more than 
higher incomes. The middle income groups typically lose. Hence, the 43.5% flat tax 
redistributes the tax burden from low and high incomes towards the middle income groups. 
Overall, the ratio of high and low skilled labour incomes remains unchanged. The basic income 
benefits low-skilled workers more than high-skilled workers and reduces the income ratio by 
7.6%.  
The 37.5% flat tax reduces the marginal tax rates for many workers. On average, the decline 
is 2.9%. This increases labour supply incentives due to substitution from leisure to 
consumption. Overall, labour supply expands by 1%. The increase in hours worked does not 
 
6 In both reforms, we maintain a lower rate in the first two brackets for the elderly above 65 as they do not pay premiums for 
the pay-as-you-go pension system. Hence, the tax structure for the elderly is not flat. 
7 Single persons and single parents maintain to receive supplementary welfare benefits. We reduce the level of 
unemployment benefits and disability benefits with the basic income. Hence, there remains only a top-up insurance for 
unemployment and disability.  
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apply to all individuals. Most primary earners and single persons face lower marginal tax rates 
as they are taxed at the margin in the higher tax brackets. Hence, these groups work longer 
hours. Many secondary earners in couples hold part-time jobs where they are taxed at the 
margin in the first bracket. The increase in the tax rate from 34% to 37.5% discourages them to 
work longer hours or to occupy small part-time jobs. Accordingly, the female participation rate 
drops by 1.7%. Working females who work longer hours increase their hours worked due to 
lower marginal tax rates in the higher tax brackets. On balance, the effect on partner labour 
supply in hours is negligible. Overall, the simulations suggest that the 37.5% flat tax causes 
more inequality in the income distribution, but it reduces distortions in labour supply. It thus 
illustrates the classical trade-off between equity and efficiency. 
Under the 43.5% flat tax, labour supply distortions become larger, rather than smaller: 
labour supply falls by 0.3%. The reason is that the marginal tax burden is shifted from people at 
the bottom and top of the income distribution towards the middle incomes. The lower tax at the 
bottom encourages non-working partners to participate in small part-time jobs. Female 
participation thus expands by 1.5%. Also high-skilled primary earners, who face a lower 
marginal tax rate, raise their hours worked. The higher marginal tax on middle incomes exerts 
negative effects on labour supply. This effect is relatively sizable for two reasons. First, it raises 
the marginal tax for the more densely populated group, which renders the distortions larger. 
Second, it raises the marginal tax primarily for secondary earners and singles who feature larger 
elasticities than male breadwinners. Labour supply of partners and singles fall by, respectively 
0.2% and 1.2%, while male breadwinner labour supply rises by only 0.1%. Hence, a flat tax 
yields less efficient redistribution than the current progressive rate structure in the Netherlands. 
The third column of Table 2 shows the effects of the basic income proposal. This reform 
reduces the replacement rate for low incomes. On average over the population, the replacement 
rate falls by 2.6%-points. The lower replacement rate induces wage moderation, encourages job 
search and job acceptance and thus reduces the unemployment rate by 1.9%. The downside of 
the basic income is a higher marginal tax burden. Indeed, a 53.5% tax is necessary to finance 
the basic income, which increases the marginal tax burden on average by 7.8%. This reinforces 
the wage moderating impact of the reform and contributes to the reduction in equilibrium 
unemployment. However, the higher marginal tax burden reduces the incentives for labour 
supply across the board. Overall, labour supply falls by 5.3% and the female participation rate 
drops by 10%. On balance, aggregate employment falls by 3.8%. The negative income tax thus 
tends to fail in improving the equity-efficiency trade-off. Removing the poverty trap while 
maintaining the minimum income guarantee will exacerbate the overall distortionary impact of 
the tax system on labour supply as it hurts labour supply incentives of the densely populated 
group of middle incomes. This is why the optimal marginal tax schedule features high marginal 
taxes for low income groups. The poverty trap thus tends to be part of an optimal tax schedule 
and minimises the distortionary cost associated with redistribution to the poor.  
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4.2  Taxation of couples 
Selective marginal tax relief for secondary earners in couples is explored in two forms: an 
extension of the selective earned income tax credit for secondary earners with children and an 
individualisation of the general tax credit. The proposed selective tax credit is linearly phased in 
between 0 and € 12 000 and that has a maximum of € 2 700. It features no phase-out range. The 
government budget is balanced by an increase in all personal income tax rates by approximately 
1%-point. Individualisation is analysed by abolishing the right to transfer the general tax credit 
to the working spouse.
8 This saves 1.75 billion euro. It is used to cut income tax rates by 0.75%-
point. The effects of both reforms are presented in Table 3. 
  
Table 3           Effects (in % changes unless indicated) of reforms in the taxation of couples 
    Secondary earner tax credit  Individualised general tax credit 
Effects on distribution       
Ratio high skilled / low skilled     - 0.0  1.8 
Ratio single earner/ two earner     - 2.7  - 5.5 
Mean of marginal tax burdens (abs. dif)    0.5  - 0.6 
Mean of replacement rates (abs. dif)    0.0  - 0.1 
Labour market effects       
Labour supply in hours    0.1  1.0 
- primary earners    - 0.3  0.1 
- secondary earners    2.2  4.8 
- single persons    - 0.3  0.4 
Female participation rate    4.7  9.5 
Aggregate employment    0.4  1.2 
Unemployment rate (abs. dif)    - 0.2  0.1 
       
Source: MIMIC simulations 
 
The selective credit for secondary earners raises the marginal tax burden for most workers due 
to a higher personal income tax rate. This reduces hours worked by primary earners and singles. 
The credit reduces the tax burden at the extensive margin of secondary earners. Accordingly, 
the female participation rate rises by 4.7%. This primarily consists of part-time jobs. Female 
labour supply in hours expands by 2.2%. On balance, the higher female participation rate 
dominates the decline in hours by males and singles so that aggregate labour supply expands by 
0.1%. The unemployment rate falls because the credit is conditional on both partners working. 
Hence, the credit encourages unemployed males and females to search for work and accept 
jobs. This improves the efficiency of job matching and reduces unemployment. Overall, 
 
8 This reform will reduce the net social minimum income in the Netherlands for couples. A number of social benefits are 
indexed by this level of social minimum. To prevent this, we raise the gross social minimum to compensate for this effect of 
the reform.  
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aggregate employment rises by 0.4%. We conclude that selective tax relief for the elastic group 
of secondary earners has the potential to raise labour-market participation, both in terms of 
persons and in terms of total labour hours. It comes at the expense of a lower disposable income 
for single-earner couples. The income ratio between high-skilled and low-skilled workers does 
not change, on average. 
Individualisation of the general tax credit raises the tax burden on single-earner couples, 
while it reduces it on other households. Accordingly, the ratio of net income for single-earner 
couples and two-earner couples falls by 5.5%. Singles and primary earners substitute 
consumption for leisure and raise labour supply due to a lower marginal tax burden. Secondary 
earners respond more. Table 3 shows that the female participation rate increases by 9.5% while 
hours worked expands by 4.8%. The reason is that the substantial increase in the after-tax 
income difference between one-earner and two-earner couples makes it attractive for partners to 
enter the labour market. These partners primarily occupy part-time jobs. As the replacement 
rate remains virtually unchanged and marginal tax rates fall, there is a small upward effect on 
wages, which exacerbates the imperfections in the right-to-manage model. This raises 
equilibrium unemployment. Overall, we find an expansion of total employment by 1.2%. 
Individualising the Dutch tax system will thus raise employment. It comes at the expense of 
single-earner families, especially those with low skills. In that respect, the reform does not fully 
escape the equity-efficiency trade-off.  
4.3  In-work tax credits 
We simulate seven alternative in-work tax credits in the Netherlands. They differ with respect 
to the phase-in range, the flat range and the phase-out range. Each credit costs 2.5 billion euro 
ex-ante. The government budget is closed by means of an increase in the income tax rates by 
approximately 1%-point. The reforms thus make the tax system more progressive. The different 
designs of the credit are illustrated in the top rows of Table 4. The first credit is a fixed amount 
of € 360 for each worker. The other credits feature a phase-in range between an annual earned 
income of € 8 000 and € 16 000. The second credit of € 390 features no phase-out range. Other 
credits differ with respect to their flat and phase-out ranges. The third and fourth credits are 
very much targeted on low incomes: they feature no flat range and are rapidly phased out with 
annual incomes between € 16 000 and € 20 000 or € 24 000. The last three credits feature a flat 
range and a phase-out range for successively higher annual incomes.    
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Table 4   Effects (in % changes unless indicated) of in-work tax credits, financed by higher income tax rates 
Design of the credit                 
Credit  € 360  € 390  €  2600  € 1800  € 1600  € 800  € 560   
Phase-in range (in € 1000)  -  8 – 16   8 – 16   8 – 16  8 – 16  8 – 16  8 – 16   
Flat range (in € 1000)  0 – ∞  16 – ∞   -  -  16 – 20   16 – 24  16 – 32   
Phase-out rang (in € 1000)  -  -  16 – 20  16 – 24  20 – 24  24 – 32  32 – 40   
Effects on distribution                 
Ratio high skilled / low skilled   - 0.7  - 0.5  - 2.1  - 2.2  - 2.5  - 1.6  - 1.0   
Mean of marginal tax burdens (abs. dif)  0.6  0.4  2.9  1.7  2.3  1.8  1.1   
Mean of replacement rate (abs. dif)  - 0.8  - 0.8  - 0.1  - 0.2  - 0.1  - 0.5  - 0.7   
Labour market effects                 
Labour supply in hours  - 0.2  0.1  - 1.2  - 0.9  - 0.7  - 0.4  - 0.2   
- primary earners  - 0.2  - 0.2  - 0.8  - 0.7  - 0.6  - 0.5  - 0.5   
- secondary earners  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.1  - 0.2  0.1  0.6   
- single persons  - 0.5  0.2  - 2.6  - 1.7  - 1.0  - 0.4  - 0.1   
Female participation rate  1.5  0.3  3.6  2.4  1.4  1.1  0.6   
Aggregate employment  0.1  0.5  - 1.0  - 0.6  - 0.3  0.0  0.3   
Unemployment rate (abs. dif)  - 0.27  - 0.27  - 0.37  - 0.34  - 0.32  - 0.35  - 0.31   
- low skilled (abs. dif)  - 0.6  - 0.6  - 0.9  - 0.7  - 0.6  - 0.7  - 0.6   
- high skilled (abs. dif)  - 0.2  - 0.2  - 0.2  - 0.2  - 0.3  - 0.3  - 0.3   
                 
Source: MIMIC simulations 
 
Table 4 reveals that all in-work tax credits reduce inequality. This is reflected in a smaller ratio 
of high-skilled and low-skilled labour income. The reason is that the value of a credit is fixed 
for all eligible workers. The higher tax rate, in contrast, hurts higher incomes more than lower 
incomes. Therefore, even the fixed in-work tax credit shifts the tax burden from low to high 
incomes. Targeted credits that only apply to people collecting lower incomes reduce inequality 
much more. 
In-work tax credits reduce the replacement rate because only workers are eligible, not social 
benefit recipients. The latter group actually faces a decline in income due to higher income tax 
rates. Hence, the incomes between people inside and outside the labour market becomes more 
dispersed.  
The marginal tax burden rises for two reasons. Fist, higher tax rates are necessary to finance 
the in-work tax credit. Second, marginal tax rates rise in the phase-out range of the credit. Yet, 
the marginal tax in the phase-in range declines. On balance, the marginal tax burden rises for 
the majority of workers, especially under the targeted credits. 
The simulations reveal that the unemployment rate falls by between 0.27% and 0.37%, 
depending on the precise design of the credit. The lower replacement rate encourages the 
unemployed to search for work and to accept jobs, thereby improving matching efficiency and 
reducing frictional unemployment. Moreover, the lower replacement rate, together with the 
higher marginal tax burden, moderates wage demands by trade unions. This further reduces 
unemployment. The decline in unemployment is concentrated among the low skilled, especially 
under the more targeted credits. This is caused by the positive interaction between the  
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replacement rate and the unemployment rate in the wage equation (1). It implies that the 
reduction in the replacement rate for low-skilled workers causes a relatively strong reduction in 
wages and, therefore, in the unemployment rate.  
In-work tax credits stimulate the participation of secondary earners. Indeed, non-
participating partners find it more attractive to participate in part-time jobs. This is reflected in 
the positive effect on the female participation rate in Table 4: it rises by between 0.3% and 
3.6%. Credits that reduce the marginal burden in the phase-in range may further encourage 
female labour supply by reducing the marginal tax burden on small part-time jobs.  
Others, like primary earners and singles, reduce their hours worked as higher marginal taxes 
induce substitution into leisure. Labour supply of primary earners falls between 0.2 and 0.8%. 
Labour supply of singles falls in most simulations, especially when the most targeted credits are 
introduced with rapid phase-out ranges. The reason is that the population of singles in the 
Netherlands is dense in the range between € 16 000 and € 20 000. Hence, distortions imposed 
by marginal tax rates in this range are large. A more gradual phasing out of the credit at higher 
incomes mitigates the adverse labour supply effects on singles.  
The labour supply effect for secondary earners is the balance of positive participation effects 
(and hours effects for partners in the phase-in range) and negative hours effects for partners in 
the phase-out range. On balance, secondary workers increase labour supply with most credits. If 
the credit is phased out between € 16 000 and € 32 000, however, the negative effect on hours 
worked dominates. Overall, Table 4 shows that aggregate labour supply drops in most reforms, 
but not all. For the credit of € 390 with a phase-in range but no phase-out, aggregate labour 
supply expands by 0.1%. Other credits reduce labour supply by between 0.2% when least 
targeted to 1.2% when most targeted.  
Our simulations thus reveal that in-work tax credits for low labour incomes are effective to 
raise participation at the extensive margin of labour supply. Thereby, more targeting reinforces 
the positive impact at the participation margin, i.e. in reducing unemployment and raising the 
female participation rate. However, targeted in-work credits also cause larger disincentives to 
work longer hours as they increase marginal tax rates elsewhere. Hence, we face a trade-off 
between stimulating participation at the extensive margin and encouraging hours worked at the 
intensive margin of labour supply. It appears that phasing out just above the minimum wage is 
counterproductive in the Netherlands since it induces large adverse labour supply effects on 
singles who often occupy part-time jobs. Phasing out higher in the income distribution is less 
distortionary. On balance, selective in-work tax credits can then raise aggregate employment. 
Depending on their design, in-work tax credits thus have the potential to improve the equity-
efficiency trade off.  
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5  Conclusions 
This paper explores reforms in the tax-benefit system that have the potential to improve equity-
efficiency trade-off. Optimal tax theory provides guidance to this. In particular, efficient 
redistribution calls for low marginal tax rates at decision margins that are relatively elastic and 
where population densities are high. We explore reforms in the Dutch tax-benefit system that 
meet these conditions by using an applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands. In the 
model various decision margins and population densities are calibrated.  
We find that flat tax reforms do not raise employment if aggregate income inequality is 
maintained. If a flat tax is combined with a basic income, it can remove the poverty trap and 
reduces low-skilled unemployment. Yet, it hurts overall labour-market performance. Hence, the 
poverty trap seems an inevitable consequence of redistribution and reflects the lowest efficiency 
cost induced by equality.  
Shifting the tax burden away from elastic secondary earners may help to raise aggregate 
employment levels. In case of the Netherlands - which features a high share of part-time work 
- this may be achieved by a progressive tax rate structure, a completion of the individualisation 
of the income tax, or an extension of selective in-work tax credits for secondary earners. 
Reforms that reduce the tax burden at the extensive margin of labour supply have the 
potential to raise employment. In-work tax credits for low incomes may reduce involuntary 
unemployment and boost female labour-market participation rates. The risk of these credits is, 
however, that they create larger distortions at the intensive margin of labour supply. These can 
more than offset the positive participation effects if the marginal tax rate increases for the 
densely populated groups. We find that phasing out in-work tax credits just above the minimum 
wage tends to create these severe labour-supply distortions.   
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